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1. Introduction
Current digital mobile networks, such as those based
on the ETSI GSM standards, provide a robust set of
security facilities for protecting communications
across the air interface.  The main security services
supported by GSM are confidentiality (of user and
signalling data) for data passed across the air
interface, authentication of mobiles to a base station,
and user identity confidentiality (across the air
interface).
Because of their universal nature, and because of the
additional requirements generated by high data rate
multimedia traffic, standards for future mobile
networks will need to support a larger range of
security services.  Possible new services include:
• end-to-end data confidentiality,
• end-to-end data integrity, and
• incontestable charging.
Moreover, there is much to be gained by
standardising some of the management aspects of
security provision.  In GSM, although the
management requirements for security are clear, the
exact means by which user key information is
generated, stored and accessed is a matter for
Network Operators and equipment providers to
arrange.  This can make the provision of these
services rather costly for all concerned, since
security management may well end being differently
arranged by every Network Operator.
In future mobile networks, possibly operating in a
rather more deregulated environment than is the
norm at present, standard support for security
management will be a very important feature.
Without such standards, the required co-operation
between the likely large numbers of competing
Network Operators and Service Providers could
become impossible complex to arrange.
In this paper we will examine some of the security
provisions in the emerging ETSI UMTS and ITU-T
FPLMTS standards for future mobile
telecommunications networks.  In particular, we
describe a mutual authentication algorithm (which
also allows for the provision of mobile user identity
confidentiality) that has been proposed for use in
these systems.  We then go on to consider some of
the problems associated with the provision of end-to-
end security services in future mobile systems, which
may be of particular relevance to future multi-media
applications.
In doing so we will describe on-going research into
security features and security management for future
mobile networks which is being performed by the
DTI/EPSRC-funded project ‘Third Generation
System Security Studies’ (3GS3), which is a part of
the LINK Personal Communications Programme.
The collaborators in this project are Vodafone Ltd,
GPT Ltd. and Royal Holloway, University of
London.
2. Third-generation
mobile systems
The term ‘Third-generation’ refers to the next
generation of mobile systems beyond existing digital
networks such as GSM, DCS1800 and DECT.  Such
systems are currently being standardised by the ITU
(as FPLMTS) and ETSI (as UMTS).  They are
characterised by the following:
1. a multiple operator environment,
2. multiple environments (residential cordless,
mobile, satellite, etc.),
3. multi-vendor/standardised interfaces,
4. use of the WARC-assigned FPLMTS band,
5. higher bit-rates (up to 2Mb/s),
6. migration from existing systems.
Currently, GSM systems support security features
such as confidentiality of user and signalling data on
the air interface, authentication of users, and user
identity confidentiality.
There are some areas where security might be
enhanced in third-generation systems, partly based
on lessons from second-generation systems, but
mostly deriving from the additional characteristics of
third-generation systems noted above.
23. Security features for
future networks
The 3GS3 project has considered the provision of
security in future mobile networks.  Initial studies
have identified the likely security threats to mobile
networks, within the context of role and functional
models for future mobile networks (also defined by
the project).  Security features necessary to address
these threats have been identified and classified.
As part of the 3GS3 project, a number of security
features have been selected for detailed study.  In
particular we are studying what types of security
mechanism can best be used to provide these
features in future mobile networks.  The selected
features were chosen using two main criteria:
1. their importance to future networks, and
2. the difficulty of providing the features (that is we
have focused our efforts on those features which
we expect to be most difficult to provide).
The main security features on which we have
concentrated our efforts during the first two years of
the project (and which will continue to be the main
focus of our research until the project completes in
early 1996) are as follows.
• Entity authentication.  We have focused our
attention in particular on entity authentication
between the user and Network Operators and/or
Service Providers.  We have examined,
classified, and tested (formally and informally) a
large number of possible mechanisms, based on a
variety of cryptographic techniques.  As a result
of our work, we have proposed an entity
authentication mechanism to both (ETSI) UMTS
and (ITU-R) FPLMTS which has been
incorporated into both sets of draft standards.
This mechanism is considered in some detail in
Section 4.  We have also considered problems
arising when some of the ‘authentication servers’
within a system may be unreliable, [1].
• Novel techniques for key distribution.  We have
focused in particular on recent work of Maurer
(see, for example, [2]).  Maurer has shown how
the concept of the ‘Wire tap channel’, introduced
by Wyner, [3], can be used in a much wider class
of situations than was envisaged by Wyner.  The
basic idea is to make use of the universal
presence of noise in communications channels to
enable two users to agree a secret key using only
‘public’ channels.  The applicability of this idea
to practical networks has been investigated, and
some interesting new theoretical results have
been discovered.
• End-to-end encipherment, and warranted
interception facilities.  These topics are a current
subject for research within 3GS3.  An overview
of the goals of our continuing work, and its
potential relevance to multi-media networks, is
given in Section 5.
• Identity and location privacy.  Current GSM
networks provide a level of user identity
confidentiality.  However, the mechanism used is
less appropriate for future networks, not least
because of the multi-operator environment likely
to prevail.  New mechanisms, based on both
public key and ‘conventional’ cryptographic
techniques, have been examined.  Of particular
note is the fact that the authentication mechanism
described in Section 4 also provides user identity
confidentiality.
• Simultaneous multiple access channel coding
and encipherment.  We have looked in particular
at CDMA, which appears to be a likely multiple
access method for future mobile networks.  The
claim that CDMA is inherently secure has been
critically examined and rejected.  The options for
using CDMA sequences as part of an
encipherment process have also been examined,
and a paper has been prepared on this topic, [4].
• Terminal-related security.  Current mobile
networks contain provisions for the black-listing
of stolen terminals, and the detection of not type-
approved terminal equipment.  The need for such
facilities in future networks has been critically
examined, particularly as the majority of mobile
terminals are likely to be relatively low-cost
items.  Whether a universal scheme is adopted, or
a scheme which only applies to valuable
terminals (such as multi-media devices), remains
a topic for debate.
One predominant feature in much of the work of the
3GS3 project has been a continuing commitment to
standards contributions, both in ETSI and in ITU-R.
Apart from mechanisms developed and adopted,
much of the text in the draft standards covering the
classification and analysis of security features has
been based on 3GS3 contributions.
4. A mechanism for
mutual authentication
In GSM networks it is theoretically possible for an
intruder to masquerade as a network operator by
imitating a base station, as GSM only provides
unilateral authentication of a user to a network
operator.  In the case of GSM it is difficult to see
how the intruder could obtain much benefit from
doing this.  However, in third-generation systems it
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considerably more over-the-air control of users.  For
instance, they may be able to disable faulty terminals
directly, or write billing data direct to the UIM (the
UMTS equivalent of a SIM).  For this reason a
mutual (two-way) entity authentication mechanism is
necessary.
The mechanism we describe here is based on the use
of secret key cryptography and provides mutual
entity authentication between the user and the
network operator.
4.1. Advantages
It sets up (and uses) a temporary key between a user
and a network operator.  This means that there is no
need for communication between a network operator
and a service provider once a user has successfully
registered with a network operator.  This is in
contrast with the existing GSM mechanism, which
requires regular communications between network
operator and service provider to transfer challenge-
response pairs.
It also combines the provision of user identity
confidentiality, entity authentication and session key
generation in a single mechanism.
The mechanism also conforms to the relevant
ISO/IEC standard, [5].
4.2. Possible Restrictions on User
Identity Confidentiality
Note that, in the mechanism described here, the
network operator is not automatically given the
user’s IMUI (International Mobile User Identity).  If
this is necessary for legal and/or operational reasons
it can be included in the third message of the ‘new
registration’ authentication mechanism.
4.3. Security Features Provided by
the Mechanism
The mechanism provides the following security
features:
1. Mutual entity authentication between the user
and the network operator.
2. User identity confidentiality over the
communications path between the user and the
network operator.
3. Session key establishment between the user and
the network operator for use in providing other
security features, possibly including
confidentiality and/or integrity for data passed
between the user and network operator.
The mechanism makes use of the following types of
cryptographic key:
• user - service provider key KSU. These are secret
keys known only to a user and their service
provider. These secret keys remain fixed for long
periods of time.
• user - network operator key KNU. These are
secret keys known only to a user and their
‘current’ network operator. These keys may
remain fixed while a user is registered with a
particular network operator.  Associated with
every such key is a Key Offset (KO), which is
used in conjunction with the user - service
provider key KSU to generate KNU.
• session key KS.  These are secret keys also
known only to the user and their current network
operator (i.e. the network operator with whom
they are registered).  A new session key is
generated as a result of every use of the
authentication mechanism.  These keys can be
used for data encipherment, and/or for the
provision of other security features.
The mechanism makes use of the following
cryptographic algorithms:
• user authentication algorithm AU.   This
algorithm takes as input a secret key and a data
string and outputs a check value RES.
• service provider authentication algorithm AS
This algorithm takes as input a secret key and a
data string and outputs a check value RES.  This
algorithm may be the same as or distinct from the
algorithm AU.
• identity hiding algorithm CU.  This algorithm
takes as input a secret key and a data string and
outputs a string CIPH used to conceal a user
identity.
• session key generation algorithm AK.  This
algorithm takes as input a secret key and a data
string and outputs a session key KS
.
• user - network operator key generation
algorithm AN.  This algorithm takes as input a
secret key and a data string and outputs a user -
network operator secret key KNU.  This algorithm
may be the same as or distinct from the algorithm
AK.
The mechanism makes use of the following types of
identifiers:
• International Mobile User Identity IMUI.  This is
an identity permanently associated with a user.
The IMUI is never passed across the air
4interface, thus preventing its unauthorised
disclosure.
• network operator identity NOID.
• temporary user identity for network operator
TMUIN.  This (temporary) identity is used to
identify a user to the network operator with
which they are currently registered.  It is known
to the user and to the current FPLMTS network
operator.
• temporary user identity for service provider
TMUIS.  This (temporary) identity is used to
identify a user to its service provider.  It is known
to the user and to its service provider.
4.4. The mechanism
There are two versions of the mechanism, depending
on whether or not the user is currently registered
with the network operator.  We consider the two
cases separately (although they are closely related).
4.4.1.
 
Current registrations
We first consider the case where the user is already
registered with the network operator.  This means
that the user and the network operator will share a
valid temporary identity TMUIN and secret key KNU.
The mechanism for this case consists of three
messages exchanged between the user and the
network operator.  The service provider is not
involved.
The three messages are as follows.
1. user → NO:  TMUIN,  RNDU
2. NO → user:  RNDN,  TMUI′N⊕CIPHN,  RESN
3. user → NO:  RESU
The values RNDU and RNDN are random
‘challenges’ generated by the user and the network
operator respectively.
The values RESU and RESN are ‘challenge responses’
generated by the user and the network operator
respectively.  RESN is calculated using the user
authentication algorithm AU with key input KNU and
data string input the concatenation of RNDN, RNDU
and TMUI′N.  RESU is calculated using the user
authentication algorithm AU with key input KNU and
data string input the concatenation of RNDU  and
RNDN.
TMUI′N is the ‘new’ temporary user identity for use
with the network operator.  This will replace the
current temporary identity TMUIN
CIPHN  is a string of bits used to conceal the new
temporary identity TMUI′N whilst it is in transit
between the network operator and the user.  It is
calculated using the identity hiding algorithm CU
with secret key input KNU and data string input
RNDU.
The user and the network operator can compute a
session key KS as the output of the session key
generation algorithm AK when given secret key input
KNU and data string input the concatenation of RNDU,
RNDN and TMUI′N.
4.4.2.
 
New registrations
We second consider the case where the user is not
registered with the network operator.  This means
that the user and the network operator do not share
any information.  The mechanism for this case
consist of five messages exchanged between the
user, the network operator, and the service provider
of the user.
The five messages are as follows.
1. user  → NO:  TMUIS,  RNDU
2. NO → SP:  TMUIS,  RNDU
3. SP → NO:  TMUI′S⊕CIPHS,  KO,  KNU,  RESS
4. NO → user:  TMUI′S⊕CIPHS,  KO,  RESS,
RNDN,  TMUI′N⊕CIPHN,  RESN
5. user → NO:  RESU
First note that we assume that a secure channel is
available for exchanging messages 2 and 3 between
the network operator and service provider.
As previously, the values RNDU and RNDN are
random ‘challenges’ generated by the user and the
network operator respectively.
The values RESU, RESN, and RESS are ‘challenge
responses’ generated by the user, network operator,
and service provider respectively.  RESN and RESU
are calculated as in the previous case.  RESS is
calculated using the service provider authentication
algorithm AS
 
with key input KSU and data string input
the concatenation of RNDU, KO and TMUI′S.
TMUI′S is the ‘new’ temporary user identity for use
with the service provider.  This will replace the
current temporary identity TMUIS.  As previously,
TMUI′N is the ‘new’ temporary user identity for use
with the network operator.
CIPHS is a string of bits used to conceal the new
temporary identity TMUI′S whilst it is in transit
between the service provider and the user.  It is
calculated using the identity hiding algorithm CU
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RNDU.  As previously, CIPHN is a string of bits used
to conceal the new temporary identity TMUI′N whilst
it is in transit between the network operator and the
user.
On receipt of message 4, the user can compute the
network operator secret key KNU as the output of the
network operator key generation algorithm AN, when
given as secret key input KSU, and data string input
the key offset KO concatenated with the network
operator identity NOID (this same calculation is
done by the service provider on receipt of message
2).
As previously, the user and the network operator can
compute a session key KS as the output of the session
key generation algorithm AK when given secret key
input KNU and data string input the concatenation of
RNDU, RNDN and TMUI′N.
Note that, as a result of the above mechanism, the
user and the network operator will share a secret key
KNU  and a temporary identity TMUI′N.
4.5. Conclusion
The proposed mechanism provides several security
features that will be required for third-generation
systems.  It is only one building block in a complete
security architecture for third-generation systems.
Further work is required to establish the efficiency of
the mechanism, and to determine how the
mechanism can be managed.  Current on-going work
within the 3GS3 project involves using a variant of
the SVO logic, [6], to verify the correctness of this
mechanism; in fact, analysis of the protocol using
this logic has already revealed a subtle flaw in an
earlier version of the protocol which has now been
corrected.
5. End-to-end security
features
5.1. Multi-media security
requirements
Multi-media terminals will clearly place demanding
bandwidth requirements on the mobile network.
These requirements have relatively little direct effect
on the provision of security features, except for the
need to ensure that any directly data-related security
features, such as the provision of data
confidentiality, are implemented using techniques
which can handle high-bandwidth data.  In practice
this will, for example, mean that encipherment
techniques used on the air interface must be capable
of handling high throughput rates, even when
implemented on mobile terminals.  However, this
should not present too much of a problem since
multi-media terminals will not be low cost items, and
the provision of appropriate processing capabilities
to handle high data-rate encipherment should not add
significantly to the overall cost of such devices.
Note that, whichever technique is chosen for
providing air interface encipherment, it will need to
be capable of implementation on the whole range of
possible user terminals, since use of more than one
encipherment algorithm would cause considerable
practial difficulties.
Much more significant to the designers of security
features for future mobile networks, are the likely
security requirements of the users of these multi-
media services, i.e. we need to identify what types of
security services these users will need.  These needs
are potentially very different from those of ‘voice’
users of existing networks.  Of particular interest are
likely to be issues such as end-to-end integrity and
confidentiality protection (by comparison with the
existing networks which do not address integrity
provision, and only provide encryption for the air
interface).
Of course this need to identify the likely security
requirements of users applies equally to other users
of data transfer facilities in future mobile networks,
who will probably also have requirements for end-to-
end security features.
5.2. End-to-end encipherment and
legal interception
Of all the end-to-end security features, the provision
of end-to-end confidentiality is by far the most
problematic.  The problem is a ‘political’ rather than
a technical one, and arises from the need for law
enforcement agencies to be given access (when the
appropriate legal authorisation exists) to any
specified communications path.  The need for such
access is clearly extremely valuable in combating
criminal activity, but also needs to be carefully
controlled because of the civil liberties issues which
arise.
The US approach (with Clipper) has been to define a
secret algorithm, for which the government has to
supply the keys.  Whilst it clearly solves the problem
of lawful interception (the government will always
know the key!) it also has serious shortcomings.
• Controlling access will be extremely difficult
(once a key is divulged to a law enforcement
agency, all traffic for that user can be read `for
ever’).
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countries, and an international solution is needed
(particularly in a part of the world like Europe
with many different national governments and
legal frameworks).
Thus there is a need for a more flexible approach
which offers the desired trans-national facilities.
This is not an easy problem to solve, particularly
given there is at present no agreed policy between
governments!
There is a growing consensus that ‘Trusted Third
Parties’ (TTPs) offer a possible means of providing
the desired warranted access, at the same time as
meeting legitimate user needs for confidentiality.
Any user wishing to make use of end-to-end
confidentiality will need to register with a TTP in
their country.  These TTPs will be ‘licensed’ in some
way, and will be required to give up keying
information to government agencies when provided
with appropriate warrants.  A key management
system will then need to be devised which will allow
a TTP to provide warranted access to any specified
user’s incoming and outgoing traffic, without
compromising any other user or alerting any other
TTPs (or any other national governments).  The TTP
should also provide its users with keys for
communication with all other users (and hence the
TTP will be seen as providing a valuable role to its
registered users, as well as to the law enforcement
agencies).
3GS3 is in the process of developing possible TTP-
based solutions to the warranted access problem,
which we believe will offer considerable advantages
over other proposed schemes.
6. Concluding remarks
Future networks are likely to have much more
stringent security requirements than current digital
networks.  This is to a large extent due to the much
wider variety of uses to which communications
channels to and from mobile terminals are likely to
be put.  This trend to wider use will, of course, be
accelerated by the likely growth in multi-media
terminal capability and availability.
In the 3GS3 project, the mechanisms to meet these
likely future needs are being examined (and, where
necessary, designed) and solutions to these security
problems are being offered to the relevant
international standards bodies.  This approach is
exemplified by the entity authentication scheme
which has now been incorporated into both the
UMTS and the FPLMTS draft standards
The project is also actively examining ways to solve
the warranted intercept problem.  Solutions to this
difficult and politically sensitive problem are
essential if end-to-end encipherment is to become a
feature in future networks.  The availability of such a
service may also have a large bearing on the
acceptability of such networks for use for multi-
media traffic.
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